Things are not what they seem: the transcendentalism of appearances in the refutation of reductive naturalism

Trafford, Tia (2011) Things are not what they seem: the transcendentalism of appearances in the refutation of reductive naturalism. Kritike: an online journal of philosophy, 5 (2). pp. 166-184. ISSN 1908-7330

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Things are not what they seem: the transcendentalism of appearances in the refutation of reductive naturalism (260kB)
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Creators:

Trafford, Tia

Description/Abstract:

This peer-reviewed paper investigates the dominant underlying approach to aesthetic experience and conscious experience more generally – that is, a neo-Kantian phenomenological approach. In essence, I argue that such approaches are based on a petitio principii in relation to what I call the 'principle of appearing qua appearing' – a principle that, I suggest, underlies the dominant approach to aesthetic perception. So, the ramifications of this argument are that we ought to question the dominance of the phenomenological approach to experience, and reassess our concepts of the aesthetic mode of perception in this light.

The paper makes a specific contribution to knowledge in this field in that it identifies a weakness in the dominant arguments relevant to our understanding of conscious experience, and clears the path for views of conscious experience that emerge in cognitive science.

The paper has been delivered at a number of major conferences, and is used as a course text at the American University of Berlin.

Item Type:

Article

Official URL:

http://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_10/trafford_d...

Date:

December 2011